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RANK-ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION
OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
ANDREJ ANGELOVSKI , TIBOR NEUGEBAUER and MAROŠ SERVÁTKA∗
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial dis-
tances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank
competition to mitigate free-riding in impure public goods. In our Rank-Order Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism (Rank-Order-VCM) group members compete via observable
contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential
access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share).
In a laboratory experiment, Rank-Order-VCM elicits median contributions equal to the
full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the con-
trol treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower
and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where
discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. (JELC91,
H41)
I. INTRODUCTION
While most public goods today are still funded
through tax revenues, tax financing is not always
viable or efficient for governments, for both
economic and political reasons, and impossible
for private organizations. The latter therefore
often have to employ voluntary contribution
mechanisms (VCMs) that persistently trigger
contributions below the social optimum level.
Furthermore, many publicly provided goods
are impure in terms of consumption as one’s
own consumption diminishes (though does not
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necessarily fully eliminate) the benefit for others,
often through congestion.1 While people may
have the same rights to access these public goods,
spatial or timely distances make access easier for
some people than for others. For instance, the
location of local public infrastructure determines
to some extent the benefit one derives from its
use. If exclusion of free-riders is impossible,
undesired, or too costly, the allocation decision
gives some people, in particular those who live
in the neighborhood, preferred access to the
local public good. In the current paper we focus
on situations where preferential access to a
publicly provided good is feasible and accept-
able. For such situations, we propose a new
mechanism that counteracts free-riding incen-
tives by introducing a rank-order competition
resulting in higher ranked contributors receiving
preferential access.
1. Publicly funded sports facilities, like community
swimming pools, are an example of a congestible public good.
They often offer time slots, at a price, to swim schools, sports
teams, and other individuals or organizations. The remaining
slots are open to recreational swimmers. However, if recre-
ational swimmers are willing to stick to the one or two non-
bookable swim lanes, they can use the swimming-pool at any
time.
ABBREVIATIONS
MPCR: Marginal Per Capita Return
VCMs: Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms
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We contribute to the growing experimental lit-
erature that investigates how incentives or com-
petition impacts cooperation in public goods
games (e.g., Cabrera et al. 2013; Croson et al.
2015; Dickinson and Isaac 1999; Falkinger et al.
2000; Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2010). In contrast
to the previous studies where incentives impact
the game structure, the introduction of rank-
order competition in our setup does not affect the
uniqueness of the free-riding equilibrium. This
kind of competition only eliminates the domi-
nance of free-riding as the best-response corre-
spondence suggests a higher contribution than
other group member(s) for a large range of con-
tribution profiles.
Rank-order competition in the context of pub-
lic goods is related to contests such as Tullock
lotteries, rank-order tournaments, or all-pay auc-
tions that provide participants of VCMs with
an opportunity to win a private prize which is
higher than their contribution to the public good,
in an attempt to mitigate free-riding behavior
(see Section II for details).2,3 One issue with
mechanisms which use contests to fund public
goods is that the cost of the prize must be cov-
ered by contributions, making them expensive
and not always feasible. The prize awarded to
the contest winner(s) can constitute a consid-
erable fraction of the total contributions of all
participants, leaving the contribution pool fur-
ther away from the socially optimal provision.
This is of particular concern when the number
of possible contributors is not sufficiently large,
as can be the case with local public goods.4 An
important advantage of our provision mechanism
is that it takes away the fixed-prize component
that has been used in almost all contests as a
mean to mitigate free-riding, thus eliminating the
efficiency loss.
2. Warr (1983) demonstrates that when a single public
good is provided at positive levels by private individuals,
small redistributions of income among contributors will leave
the total provision of public goods unchanged; which is
known as Warr’s neutrality finding. However, in models with
impure public goods, such as public good funded by contests,
neutrality does not hold (Cornes and Sandler 1994; Morgan
2000).
3. For example, in the UK 28% of the funds collected
through the national lottery goes to charity and public good
projects, while 12% goes back to the state. Lotteries are
considered a joint public-private good (impure public good)
as purchasing lottery tickets leads to a chance to win a private
prize as well as contribute to a public good (Morgan 2000).
4. For a review of local public goods (identified by geo-
graphical space), and club goods (local public goods not iden-
tified by geographical space; mostly by size and crowding
costs), see Scotchmer (2002).
Another advantage of our mechanism is that it
does not prescribe fully excluding anyone from
accessing the public good and only requires pref-
erential or discriminatory access, which is often
less costly and more likely to be acceptable.
One important instance where we envision the
mechanism to potentially be applied is crowd-
funding of projects with a “public good flavor.”
Cason and Zubrickas (2017) argue that the recent
large growth in crowdfunding revenue worldwide
could have been driven by contributions coming
from socially minded people and from the cam-
paigner’s network (see Kuppuswamy and Bayus
2018) and may slow down as this population is
exhausted. As such, it will become increasingly
more important to attract contributions from a
broader range of donors, especially for commu-
nity, charity, or art and creative projects, which
can be done through implementing simple and
effective mechanisms. We believe our rank-order
mechanism is an example of such mechanism
that could lead to a significant improvement in
outcomes.5 One can imagine organizing cultural
events, such as stage productions or music events,
where a higher donor receives a preferential
access in terms of larger number of tickets, ear-
lier access to tickets, or preferred seating (though
we note that there is a fine line whether some
of these attributes mean a larger consumption
of the public good or access to a superior con-
sumption good). Funding social entrepreneur-
ship projects related to community development,
such as the above-mentioned sports facilities
that give a preferential access to high donors,
is another every-day life situation where the
rank-order mechanism has considerable practical
potential.
In what follows, we present the Rank-Order
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (hereafter
Rank-Order-VCM) that utilizes competition to
mitigate free-riding by setting up a contest in the
form of rank-order tournament. Under voluntary
contribution the collection of public good funds
is straightforward, but the incentive to free-ride
always persists. If exclusion of free-riders is
problematic, the social planner can devise a
contest which gives high contributors preferred
access to the public good. Rank-Order-VCM
allows the planner to implement a relative reward
system in which, through the allocation decision,
5. For example, Kickstarter—a global crowdfunding
platform focusing on invention and creativity—has in recent
years seen project creators offer rewards related to preferen-
tial access or product exclusives to those willing to contribute
more to their project. (Kickstarter.com)
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free-riding incentives are counteracted by mak-
ing the enjoyment of an (impure) public good
more restrictive for low contributors. While all
individuals may have the right to access the
public good, timely or spatial distances can make
access easier for some and more restrictive for
others.6
In Rank-Order-VCM individuals compete
with their observable contributions towards a
public project for a larger share of the payoff
that the project generates. The design of the
mechanism ensures that people who contribute
more (and thus earn a larger share of the pay-
off) are less likely to feel taken advantage of
as it has often been reported by subjects in
VCM experiments.7 To test whether presence
of rank-order competition overcomes the free-
rider problem we compare it to Random Rank
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (hereafter
Control treatment)—an institution that allocates
the shares from the public project randomly but
maintains all other features of the Rank-Order-
VCM environment and thus provides a control
in which competition for preferred access is not
feasible. We conjecture that competition created
by Rank-Order-VCM will result in increased
contributions to the public good compared to
the Control treatment. We base our conjecture
on best-response correspondences that suggest
increasing one’s own contribution relative to the
other group members for most strategy profiles
in Rank-Order-VCM whereas in the Control
treatment the unique best-response implies
zero contribution.
Next we present a literature review, the mech-
anism, experimental setup, and our results, fol-
lowed by a short discussion. Subject instructions
are provided in Appendix A.
6. Another specific example is financing a cultural event
(e.g., a theater play) through voluntary contributions with the
person who contributed more receiving higher quality seats.
In the same fashion, a person who exerts more effort, spends
more time on the project or invests more money into it would
earn a larger share of the profit in a team production scenario,
or airlines with higher contributions towards the airport would
get their preferred time slots or gates.
7. The idea of focusing on preferences for cooperation in
a VCM setting has been suggested by Andreoni (1995). For
studies and details on conditional cooperation in the VCM,
see Keser and van Winden (2000), Fischbacher, Gächter, and
Fehr (2001), Levati and Neugebauer (2004), Burlando and
Guala (2005), Kurzban and Houser (2005), Chaudhuri and
Paichayontvijit (2006), Chaudhuri (2011), Gunnthorsdottir,
Houser, and McCabe (2007), Neugebauer et al. (2009), or
Fischbacher and Gachter (2010).
II. RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE
Substantial literature, both theoretical and
experimental, has identified the free-rider
problem in organizational and societal set-
tings (see Ledyard 1995 for a review). A small
but growing research stream recognizes institu-
tions that mitigate or completely eliminate this
problem (Kosfeld and Riedl 2004 review the
literature). Other papers test these institutions
experimentally; it is this literature to which we
wish to contribute.
One type of mechanism that has been pro-
posed to alleviate free-riding involves sanctions
and rewards. These sanctions and rewards, usu-
ally based on some form of rank-ordering of
contributions, are either experimenter-imposed
(e.g., Croson et al. 2015; Dickinson 2001; Dick-
inson and Isaac 1999; Falkinger et al. 2000;
Groves and Ledyard 1977; Harbring and Irlen-
busch 2005; Orrison, Schotter, and Weigelt
2004), or participant-imposed (e.g., Fehr and
Gächter 2000; Masclet et al. 2003; Noussair and
Tucker 2005). However, even though in some of
these studies competition does occur, it is not
the main focus and therefore the observed exper-
imental results cannot provide a direct answer
whether competition is capable of increasing
voluntary contributions on its own. For example,
Dickinson (2001) investigates a mechanism in
which all but the most cooperative member of the
group incur a fixed fine and the most cooperative
member receives a bonus payment. Orrison,
Schotter, and Weigelt (2004) and Harbring and
Irlenbusch (2005) use a tournament incentive
structure involving rewards for winners and
sanctions for losers, and find that the additional
incentives provide a large initial boost to coop-
eration, which diminishes over time. In Croson
et al. (2015), the minimum contribution within a
group is sanctioned, implying a game structure
with multiple equilibria among which the Pareto
efficient is selected by subjects in the experi-
ment. In this paper, we go further by showing
that neither the exclusion of noncontributors nor
the change in equilibrium is required to trigger
high contributions; a change in the best-response
correspondences is sufficient to dramatically
change contribution behavior. The use of a rel-
ative reward system is the main distinguishing
feature between our Rank-Order VCM and other
proportional and contest-based mechanisms.
In a closely related study to ours, Falkinger
et al. (2000) design a mechanism in which
subjects pay a tax if they contribute below the
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average contribution and receive a subsidy if they
contribute above the average contribution. The
authors find not only a significant initial effect
on contributions but also increasing cooperation
over time. In contrast to continuous changes in
the marginal per capita return (MPCR) due to
the tax/subsidy, our study focuses on discrete
changes due to rank-order tournament rather than
by comparing one’s contribution to the average
of the group. The other notable difference is that
in the mechanism of Falkinger et al. the efficient
level of public good provision is achieved in
the Nash equilibrium; the efficient provision is
a weakly dominant strategy. In contrast to the
Falkinger mechanism, free-riding is the unique
equilibrium in our design. So, whereas the
Falkinger mechanism changes the equilibrium
contributions relatively to the voluntary contri-
bution game from free-riding to full contribution,
our Rank-Order-VCM maintains free-riding as
the unique Nash equilibrium.
While experimentally imposed sanctions and
rewards have been successfully used to solve
the free-rider issue, mostly in the form of tax
systems, they all assume that the social plan-
ner can penalize noncontributors. This, however,
is often not a feasible solution, either because
the social planner might not have the power to
impose punishment or because it could be too
costly to enforce. More recently, incentive mech-
anisms in the form of contests (see Konrad 2009;
Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2015 for a
review) have been found to successfully mitigate
free-riding without requiring the institution con-
ducting the contest to impose sanctions. While
revenue comparisons of all-pay and first-prize
(winner-pay) auctions as mechanisms to increase
contributions to a public good (e.g., Carpenter,
Holmes, and Matthews 2008; Goeree et al. 2005;
Orzen 2008; Schram and Onderstal 2009) still
require further experimental testing, most of the
research has zeroed in on all-pay lotteries and all-
pay auctions. Next, we elaborate on themost rele-
vant contests used to enhance the standard VCM.
Morgan (2000) and Morgan and Sefton
(2000) theoretically and experimentally show
that Tullock fixed-prize lotteries (Tullock 1980)
can be successfully used to increase public good
provisions and substantially decrease free-riding.
Without budget constraints, the model suggests
that the higher the prize of the contest, the closer
the contributions are to the social optimum
level. Goeree et al. (2005) show that winner-
pay auctions are not very efficient fund-raising
mechanisms, and that all-pay auctions dominate
lotteries and popular winner-pay auctions. Cor-
razini, Faravelli, and Stanca (2010), Faravelli
and Stanca (2012), and Bos (2011) extend these
results to all-pay contests with heterogeneous
endowments. Lange, List, and Price (2007) com-
pare the efficiency of contests when participants
have both homogeneous and heterogeneous
MPCRs, while Faravelli and Stanca (2014) look
at the relation between competitive economic
incentives and social preferences. The results
in all these papers confirm that prize-based
mechanisms lead to higher levels of contribu-
tions and to lower levels of free-riding than the
standard VCM.
One issue with all current studies looking
at contests as a mechanism to solve free-riding
is that the contest prize is expensive and must
be covered by the contributions. The reason for
using a fixed prize in lotteries, rather than a prize
that is a percentage of total contributions, is that
the equilibrium provision in such a fractional-
prize contest is equal to that obtained by the
standard VCM (Morgan 2000). Thus, the major-
ity of the above-mentioned papers provide a
fixed reward to the contest winners, which still
constitutes a considerable fraction of the total
endowment of all participants. Once the prize is
subtracted from the contributions, what is left in
the pool is below the social optimum, leading to
a lower efficiency compared to our mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge the experimental
studies on contests and public goods that have
an identical number of group members (four), as
well as identical average multiplier (0.5) as we
do, provide a fixed-prize ranging from 25% (e.g.,
Orzen 2008) to 33% (e.g., Corrazini, Faravelli,
and Stanca 2010; Faravelli and Stanca 2012) of
the sum of the endowments.
In addition, while past experiments have
shown that fixed-prize contests can increase con-
tribution levels in comparison to a standard VCM
even after subtracting the prize, they have also
shown that the size of the prize does matter. If
the number of participants is sufficiently large a
high prize might behaviorally entice participants
to contribute more, even though this decreases
the probability of winning. However, when the
number of possible contributors is limited, either
by distance or crowding, as is often the case in
the provision of local public goods, the size of
the fixed prize may be of particular concern.
In comparison to previous studies, our Rank-
Order-VCM mechanism takes away the fixed-
prize component and instead differentiates access
to the public good. As such, it decreases the
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cost of the contest compared to the previously
studied mechanisms that involve a fixed prize
and, as supported by our results, appears to be
more efficient in eliminating free-riding.
According to Buchanan (1968), who defines
an impure public good as “any departure from the
availability of equal quantities of homogeneous-
quality consumption units to all customers,” as
long as the supply of the good is collectively and
cooperatively organized, the public goods model
holds even if impurities are present. However,
the introduction of competition allows us to alter
the incentives to free-ride. Cornes and Sandler
(1994) show that compared to a pure public good,
an impure one decreases incentives to free-ride
and increases provision.
Our Rank-Order-VCM not only rewards high
contributors as in typical contest mechanisms but
also directly decreases the free-riding incentives.
Importantly, it does so by still providing access to
the public good for everyone, regardless of con-
tributions. The access is preferential to those who
contribute the most while free-riders and lower
contributors are sanctioned by limited access.
The mechanism requires no taxation or fine, both
of which might come at an administrative cost.
In a related study to ours in terms of com-
petition effects, Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport
(2006) show that combining voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism with intergroup competition
for an exogenous and commonly known
prize reduces free-riding. Gunnthorsdottir and
Rapoport implement two different profit sharing
rules (egalitarian and proportional) under which
the prize is distributed to members of the winning
group and find that the proportional sharing rule
does better than the egalitarian one. However,
from their design it is not obvious to what degree
the proportional sharing rule contributes to the
reduction of free-riding as it is coupled with
intergroup competition. Finally, Cabrera et al.
(2013) hierarchically divide participants in two
groups who simultaneously play the voluntary
contribution game; one group is called the major
and the other the minor league. After each period
there is a regrouping; the most cooperative sub-
ject of the minor league is promoted to the major
league and the worst free-rider of the major
league is demoted to the minor league. Cabrera
et al. find that this kind of competition leads
to increased contribution levels in both leagues
relative to the standard VCM.
In contrast to papers that study the impact of
group formation based on the ranks of observable
contributions, in our experiment we avoid using
different groups and focus solely on the situa-
tion where a larger share of the public good goes
to a higher contributor. Our Rank-Order-VCM
(to be described in detail below) creates com-
petition among contributors who are randomly
assigned to a group and who repeatedly interact
within the same group without having to change
its composition.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, PROCEDURES, AND
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Rank-Order VCM
In Rank-Order-VCM, each individual from a
group of four (n= 4) faces the following deci-
sion problem: how much of the initial endow-
ment (e= 50 cents) to contribute to a public good
(ci), respectively how much of it to keep (e – ci).
Each cent kept generates a payoff only for the
given individual; each cent contributed towards
the public good generates payoffs for all group
members. The final payoff to individual i is deter-
mined by his own and the others’ contributions
via:
πi
(
ci, c−i
)
= e − ci + mi
n∑
j=1
cj.
The individual multiplier (mi) is determined
by the contribution rank of individual i (i’s con-
tribution relative to the amount contributed by
the other members of the group); the higher
the contribution the higher the multiplier. In the
experiment, we have implemented the follow-
ing parameterization; based on an averageMPCR
from the project of 0.5:8
• If i’s contribution is the highest one, the
multiplier (marginal return); mi = 0.65.
• If i’s contribution is the second highest;
mi = 0.55.
• If i’s contribution is the third highest;
mi = 0.45.
• If i’s contribution is the lowest; mi = 0.35.9
In case of a tie, that is, if two or more group
members allocate the same amount to the project,
8. Although we did not run the standard VCM with the
marginal per capita return= 0.5, this choice of design makes
our results comparable to previous studies implementing such
setup (e.g., Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008).
9. Note that our general setup includes as special cases
the standard symmetric VCM (mi =m mi =mjfor all i) and
the proportional rule (mi =
2ci∑n
j=1 cj
mi =
ci∑n
j=1 cj
∗ 2 for all
i if
∑n
j=1 cj > 0,
∑4
j=1 cj > 0 and 0 otherwise) studied in
Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006).
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the corresponding multipliers are averaged. For
instance, if the highest allocation is equal to the
second highest, the multiplier for the two group
members is 0.6 [= (0.65+ 0.55)/2]. If all four
group members contribute the full endowment
(e= 50), the multiplier for each one of them is
0.5. Hence, groupmembers contributing the same
amount earn the same.
In Rank-Order-VCM, individuals are
rewarded based on their contribution rank
towards a group project. Given our parame-
terization, the unique Nash equilibrium is the
situation where everyone free-rides, but it is not
a dominant strategy equilibrium of the stage
game as in the standard VCM.10 While the Rank-
Order-VCM mechanism allows for manipulating
the Nash equilibrium (for example, with more
polarized marginal returns, all members con-
tributing their full endowment can also be a Nash
equilibrium), the parameterization implemented
in the experiment constitutes a stronger test
of our conjecture that rank-order competition
is capable of mitigating free-riding than a set
up with positive contributions as part of the
equilibrium would.
It is important to note that if we were to
observe a different behavior in Rank-Order-VCM
than in VCM it would not be obvious whether
it is due to competition or not. In particular,
Rank-Order-VCM and the standard VCM differ
mainly in two additional aspects: the heterogene-
ity of marginal returns and the endogeneity of
individual marginal per capita returns, related to
the fact that subjects learn about their marginal
returns only after their decision has been made
as opposed to knowing what the MPCR before
the decision is made as is the case in VCM. Thus
Rank-Order-VCM does not only capture the vol-
untary cooperation possibilities of standard VCM
but also the competition for a higher rank. To
identify the competition effect of Rank-Order-
VCM, we run an appropriate control treatment
with identical payoff parameters but randomly
assigned ranks.
B. Control Treatment
Our Rank-Order-VCM differs from the stan-
dard VCM in two ways, one is the element of
competition, and the second is themarginal return
parameter mi which group members learn only
10. If, for instance, the three other members of the group
contribute 49 and the individual i rides free, he misses out on
gaining more by contributing 50 instead. See the next section
for more details.
after the contribution decisions aremade. In order
to isolate the effect of competition in Rank-
Order-VCM, our Control treatment implements
identical payoff parameters as Rank-Order-VCM
by randomly assigning ranks to all members of
the group. The software draws a rank for each
individual from the set {1, 2, 3, 4} with replace-
ment. Just as before, the individual marginal
returns from a project are 0.65, 0.55, 0.45, or
0.35, based on this random rank. In case of a tie,
the marginal returns get averaged. Group mem-
bers learn their marginal returns after the simul-
taneous decisions are made. In the Control treat-
ment free-riding equilibrium of the stage game is
unique and in dominant strategies.
C. Theoretical Considerations
Subjects in the Rank-Order-VCM treatment
participate in a contest that distinguishes the
mechanism from the standard VCM. In a contest,
decision makers maximize their expected payoff
for a given probability of winning. In our Rank-
Order-VCM the four prizes are described by the
multiplier and the size of the group project. Let
pk(ci, c−i) denote the probability that subject i
obtains multiplier mk by contributing ci given the
contribution of the others. The decision problem
for the individual can be written down as follows:
Eπi
(
ci, c−i
)
= e − ci +
4∑
j=1
cj
4∑
k=1
mkpk
(
ci, c−i
)
.
In the Control treatment, the probability of
each multiplier is equal to 1∕4 independently of
the subject’s contribution. The expected payoff in
the Control treatment is the same as in the stan-
dard VCM with a multiplier of 0.5. The unique
best response (assuming standard self-regarding
preferences) is zero contribution.
In the Rank-Order-VCM treatment the prob-
ability of obtaining a higher multiplier increases
with the subject’s contribution and decreases with
contributions of the other group members. Indi-
viduals must have beliefs about the contribu-
tion profile of the others in order to play a best
response. There are 132,651 (= 513) different
pure contribution profiles of the other three group
members. Assuming an individual assigns equal
probability to each of the profiles, Figure 1 shows
the expected payoffs for each possible pure con-
tribution strategy profile. Hence, free-riding is a
local maximum but not a global maximum as
in the standard VCM. If the individual actually
believes that all contribution profiles of the others
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FIGURE 1
Expected Payoff of Each Strategy Assuming Equally Likely Contribution Profiles of Others
are equally likely, a full contribution of the entire
endowment maximizes the expected payoff.
To illustrate the incentives faced by an
individual group member in the Rank-Order-
VCM we next present an analysis of the
best-response correspondence.
Best-Response Correspondence. To demon-
strate the effect of rank-order competition
on private incentives to contribute and to
make prediction about behavior, we outline
the best-response correspondence for the stage
game assuming self-regarding preferences (in
the case of other-regarding preferences, incen-
tives to contribute can exist in both treatments).
In line with the experimental design we consider
integer contributions, groups of four and the
implemented parameters.
The best-response function for an individual
participating in the Control treatment requires
zero contribution for any contribution profile of
the others, ci
*(c−i)= 0,∀ c−i.
The following equation describes the best-
response correspondence for an individual in the
Rank-Order-VCM, assuming symmetric contri-
butions of the other group members:
c∗∗i
(
c−i|cj = ĉ∀j ≠ i)(1)
=
{
0 if ĉ = {0, e}
ĉ + 1 if ĉ ∈ {1, … , e − 1} .
In words; if the other three members all con-
tribute zero or full endowment, the best response
prescribes a zero contribution, otherwise the best
response requires having higher contributions
than the other group members by one unit.
In the case of heterogeneous contributions of
the other group members, the best-response cor-
respondence is complex and not always unique.11
Generally, best-response contributions beat one
of the other member’s contribution by 1 or pre-
scribe zero or full endowment contributions. For
instance, assume two other group members con-
tribute their entire endowment. If the contribu-
tion of the third group member is below 19,
then the best response exceeds the third con-
tribution by one unit. If the third group mem-
ber contributes between 19 and 49 units, the best
response implies a contribution of the entire
endowment. Lastly, the best response prescribes
zero contribution if all three other groupmembers
contribute 50. Figure 2 shows, for each strategy,
the probability of being the best response given
the 132,651 pure contribution profiles of others
(assuming the others choose each strategy with
equal probability). Note that zero contribution is
the best response only infrequently (i.e., for 104
profiles or 0.078%), in fact, less frequently than
any other strategy.
11. For some strategy profiles of the others, there are
multiple best-responses (6 profiles with three, and 525 profiles
with two best responses accounting for permutations). For
instance, if the profile of the others is (39, 17, 3), the individual
has the following three best-responses; {40, 18, 4} each of
which yields a payoff of 74.35.
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FIGURE 2
Probability of Best Response Strategy Assuming Equally Likely Contribution Profiles of Others
For the implemented parameterization, zero
contribution is a dominant strategy and there-
fore all group members contributing nothing is
a strict Nash equilibrium in the Control treat-
ment. In the Rank-Order-VCM treatment, zero
contributions by all group members constitute
a unique Nash equilibrium; there however exist
strategy profiles of the other group members for
which contributing zero is not a best response.
Based on the best-response correspondences, the
conclusion is straight forward in that contribu-
tions in the Rank-Order-VCM treatment should
weakly exceed those in the Control treatment,
ci
*(c-i)≤ ci
** (c-i). We draw this conclusion from
the fact that the best response requires the same
contribution in both treatments if the other group
members contribute all or nothing, whereas the
best response requires a higher (i.e., non-zero)
contribution for any other profile of other group
members’ contributions.
D. Testable Hypothesis
Based on the equilibrium predictions, we
expect no differences in behavior between Rank-
Order-VCM and Control. Mutual free-riding
defines the best responses. In particular, the uni-
que Nash equilibrium implies free-riding in each
stage of the repeated game for both treatments.
This null hypothesis assumes (unbounded)
rationality and self-regarding preferences.
Our alternative hypothesis is that the compe-
tition in Rank-Order-VCM induces an upward
shift towards the efficient allocation since incen-
tives exist that contributors may earn more than
noncontributors in some (non-equilibrium)
instances. Based on the discussion of the
best-response correspondence, we predict a
significantly higher contribution level in Rank-
Order-VCM than in Control.
E. Procedures
The experiment consisted of two treatments,
Rank-Order-VCM and Control, implemented in
an across subjects design. All sessions were con-
ducted in the New Zealand Experimental Eco-
nomics Laboratory at the University of Can-
terbury. A total of 64 undergraduate subjects
were recruited for the experiment.12 Most of the
subjects had not previously participated in eco-
nomics experiments (and none had participated in
a social dilemma experiment). Each subject only
participated in a single session of the study. We
ran four sessions with exactly 16 subjects in each
session. On average, a session lasted 75minutes
including initial instructional period and payment
12. As we have four-subject groups, the number of inde-
pendent observations is eight in each treatment, in Control
and in Rank-Order-VCM. Comparing the average contribu-
tions across our two treatments, we obtain (ex-post) a power-
measure of 0.8189 (d= 1.38, α= .05, n1 = n2 = 8, one-tailed).
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of subjects. Subjects earned on average 23.51
NZD.13 We did not pay a show-up fee. All earn-
ings were calculated in New Zealand cents. All
sessions were computerized and run under single
blind social distance protocol. The experiment
was programmed and conducted with the soft-
ware z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
The assignment of subjects into groups was
done according to the following process. Upon
entering the laboratory subjects drew a number
from an envelope. The number indicated their
computer terminal for the experiment. The ter-
minals were randomly matched into anonymous
groups of four by the server. The composition
of each group remained the same throughout the
experiment. All this was known to the subjects
and so was the fact that all members of the group
faced the same decision problem.
Each subject was provided a hard copy of
neutrally framed instructions that were identi-
cal across subjects. The experimenter read the
instructions aloudwith subjects following the text
in their own hard copy. After finishing reading
the instructions and answering the questions, we
administered a computerized test to check for
understanding of the decision making environ-
ment. The subjects were asked to individually
select four numbers (with two numbers being
equal) that would represent four contributions.
After choosing the four numbers the test soft-
ware asked them to calculate the multipliers and
profits for all group members. It did not allow
them to proceed until they answered all ques-
tions correctly.
The decision-making part of the experiment
followed. Each session consisted of 2x15 rounds
to check for a restart effect. After restart the
subjects remained in the same group as before
(partners design). In every round of the play the
subjects were endowed with 50 NZ cents and had
to decide howmuch of this endowment to allocate
to a project and howmuch to keep for themselves.
The individual round payoffs were computed
as the money the subjects kept plus the sum
allocated to the project by all four members of
the group where the latter was multiplied by
their own personal multiplier. In Rank-Order-
VCM the personal multiplier was determined
depending on the amount the subject contributed
towards the project and on the rank order of this
amount relative to the contributions of the other
members of the group. In the Control treatment
13. The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time
of the experiment was 10.25 NZD per hour.
the multiplier was randomly determined by the
computer. Each round, the software would draw
a number 1, 2, 3, or 4 (with replacement to
allow for ties) for each subject. The subject’s
individual multiplier was determined according
to the rank of his random number. In particular, if
the subject’s number was the highest in the group,
the multiplier was 0.65; 0.55 if it was the second
highest; 0.45 if it was the third; and finally, 0.35
if the number was the lowest.
After each round the subjects received feed-
back information on the amount they and their
group allocated to the project. They received
information on the individual allocation ordered
from highest to lowest but were not be able to
trace the amount to the person who allocated it.
They also received information about their per-
sonal multiplier, the resulting payoff from the
project, the amount of money kept, and their
round payoff. This information was recorded in
a table on the subjects’ screen and was available
for all past rounds. At restart, the information for
the first 15 rounds was cleared.
At the end of the experiment subjects were
asked to fill out a questionnaire on demographics
and strategies used when making the decisions.
Finally, theywere privately paid their earnings for
the session.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Figure 3 presents the comparison of average
and median contributions in the 2× 15 periods
of the Rank-Order-VCM and Control treatments.
While the average contribution in Rank-Order-
VCM starts at 35.9 and oscillates between 30.1
and 41.8, the average contribution in Control
starts at 25.4 and steadily declines throughout the
whole experiment to reach its minimum of 6.8 in
period 25. In the last period, the average contri-
bution is equal to 7.9. The median contribution
shows even a sharper contrast: In Rank-Order-
VCM, the median contribution is equal to the
entire endowment in all periods but 9, while in
Control the median contribution starts at 24 and
drops down to 0 by the end of the experiment.
A. Treatment Effect
The exact two-tailed Wilcoxon test for
independent samples reveals that the group
contributions in Rank-Order-VCM and Control
are significantly different at 5% level for both
the first 15 periods (p value= .038) and for
the second 15 periods (p value= .005). Each
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FIGURE 3
Median and Average Contributions in Rank-Order-VCM and Control
treatment involved eight independent groups.
The average contribution per group member was
38.5 (13.8) in Rank-Order-VCM and 16.4 (11.5)
in Control (standard deviation in parentheses).
This difference is also statistically significant
(p value= .005). The sample of individual first
contributions which involves 32 observations
per treatment suggests that the differences in
contributions are significant right from period
1; the p value of the two-tailed Wilcoxon test is
0.037. Hence, we can conclude that Rank-Order-
VCM leads to significantly higher contributions
than Control.
Figure 4 depicts the distribution of contribu-
tions for both Control and Rank-Order-VCM.
More than a third of all contributions (33.54%)
in Control are zero contributions, which is both
the unique best response and a Nash equilib-
rium strategy, whereas 15.63% of contributions
are maximal ones. In comparison, only 6.04% of
Rank-Order-VCM contributions are at the zero
mark, and 62.50% of all contributions are maxi-
mal ones. As predicted by Figure 2, contributions
in Rank-Order-VCM are heavily right skewed
towards maximal contributions.
Figure B1 in Appendix B, depicting the distri-
bution of contributions in period one only, shows
that there is a difference in distributions from the
very first period but also clearly indicates that
this difference grows over time. This difference in
contribution over time is depicted in Figure 5. It
confirms that in the presence of competition con-
tributions are larger from the very first period, and
that this difference almost triples towards the lat-
ter rounds.
B. Heterogeneity Analysis
Figure 6 depicts contribution by rank within a
group, from highest to lowest, averaged for all
eight groups in each treatment. Over time, con-
tributions for each of the four ranks in Control,
averaged between groups, are significantly lower
compared to those of Rank-Order-VCM; 32.52
vs. 46.85 (p value <.001) for the highest rank,
21.30 vs. 42.24 (p value <.001) for the second
highest rank, 11.53 vs. 34.70 (p value <.001)
for the third highest rank, and 4.38 vs. 24.40
(p value <.001) for the fourth highest rank, using
a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
When looking at contributions in period 1,
all ranks in Rank-Order-VCM also start signifi-
cantly higher than in Control. As we only have
eight observations for each rank per treatment in
a period, we combine the first three periods and
run a Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the first
three periods for each rank between the two treat-
ments. The average of the first three initial con-
tributions is 41.17 vs. 48.54 (p value= .078) for
the highest rank, 30.75 vs. 45.21 (p value< .001)
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FIGURE 4
Contribution Distributions in Control and Rank-Order-VCM
FIGURE 5
Average Contribution Difference between Rank-Order-VCM and Control
for the second highest rank, 21.96 vs. 33.29
(p value= .049) for the third highest rank, and
7.71 vs. 23.38 (p value= .004) for the fourth
highest rank. While initial contributions in Con-
trol do start lower than in Rank-Order-VCM, it
is clear that the differences further increase over
time. Additionally, contributions in Control, for
all ranks, decrease over time, whereas in Rank-
Order-VCM they largely remain stable with a
slight decrease by the lowest rank.
Figures 7 and 8 depict the nonaggregated
contribution by rank for each of the 16 groups,
thus allowing us to analyze between-group
heterogeneity. While contributions of all groups
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FIGURE 6
Average Contributions by Rank in Rank-Order-VCM and Control
in Control decrease over time, Figure 7 clearly
shows heterogeneity between them; groups four
and five have the highest contributor contribute
mostly at the maximal level, whereas in groups
one, two, seven, and eight the median con-
tribution over time is at or below 50% of the
endowment. Regarding the lowest contributor, in
seven out of eight groups the median contribution
over time is below the 10% level.
The presence of between group heterogeneity
in Rank-Order-VCM can also be observed, but
less so than in Control. Figure 8 depicts groups
one, four, six, and eight having almost maxi-
mal contributions for at least three of the four
subjects, and only group seven has the median
contribution of the highest contributor below the
maximal one (all groups except two and seven
have both the highest and second highest contrib-
utor’s median contribution at the maximal level).
C. Dynamics
Our results from Control are in line with the
stylized facts on the symmetric VCM reported
by Ledyard (1995): The initial contributions are
almost exactly half of the endowment and their
decline is significant as shown by the random
effects regression of the average group contribu-
tion on the time trend. The details are presented
in Table 1, column (1). The regression involves a
dummy variable for the restart of the game inter-
acted on the time trend. The decline is significant
in both the original and in the restart game. The
difference in contributions between the original
and the restart game is evident: Each group in
the Control treatment contributes lower amounts
in the restart game than in the original game
(p value= .008).
For Rank-Order-VCM, the average contribu-
tion increases from 37.3 to 39.6 between the
original and the restart game. However, this dif-
ference is not significant as three groups increase
and three groups decrease their contributions
while two groups always contribute their full
endowment. No significant time trend can be
detected by the random effects dummy regression
in the original or in the restart game for Rank-
Order-VCM. The regression results are recorded
in Table 1, column (2). Finally, based on the
group data we observe that average contributions
decline significantly more in Control than in
Rank-Order-VCM (column [3]).
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FIGURE 7
Contributions by Rank in Control for Each Group
Andreoni and Croson (2008) provide evidence
that following a surprise restart in the symmet-
ric VCM contributions jump back almost to their
initial level after having declined in the orig-
inal game. In our experiment, the restart was
announced at the beginning of the experiment and
so the subjects anticipated the restart game. In the
absence of surprise, we do not find a significant
restart effect (p values are .208 and .600 for Con-
trol and Rank-Order-VCM, respectively, when
comparing contribution changes between periods
15 and 16 to changes between periods 14 and 15).
Starting from the second period, we calcu-
lated the ex-post best-response for each subject
based on the other’s contributions in the pre-
vious period. The random effects regression in
Table 2 shows that, Rank-Order-VCM, subjects’
contribution decisions are significantly attracted
towards the ex-post best-response, that is, the
best-response to the other group members’
contributions in period t-1 has a significant effect
on the contribution in period t.14
14. This behavior is in line with learning direction the-
ory as proposed by Selten (2004). Goerg, Neugebauer, and
Sadrieh (2016) provide a recent literature review.
In Control, the best-response predicts a con-
tribution of zero in all cases (see Table B1
in Appendix B for a regression including both
Rank-Order-VCM and Control), therefore con-
ducting a similar analysis for Control treatment
only is not feasible. However, the declining con-
tribution reported in Table 1 column (1) shows an
adjustment towards the best response with repe-
tition for Control.
In summary, we observe no repetition effect
and no contribution decline in Rank-Order-VCM.
In contrast, there is a significant contribution
decline in Control. In addition, we find no restart
effect in either of the two treatments and observe
a positive correlation of contributions to the ex-
post best-response.
V. DISCUSSION
Our paper introduces a rank-order mechanism
that counters the incentives to free-ride through
competition in the VCM framework. Rank-
Order-VCM assumes that one can give preferred
access to the local public good to certain group
members and thus generate heterogeneous
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FIGURE 8
Contributions by Rank in Rank-Order-VCM for Each Group
TABLE 1
Random-Effects Regression: Average Contribution per Group on Time Trend
(Column ID) (1) Control (2) Rank-Order-VCM (3) Both Treatments
Number of observations 240 240 480
Number of independent observations 8 8 16
Independent variables
Intercept 27.847*
(4.415)
[.000]
39.999*
(5.195)
[.000]
37.708*
(4.619)
[.000]
Dummy Restart 1.467
(2.372)
[.536]
4.759
(2.468)
[.054]
Period −.708*
(.217)
[.001]
−.334
(.221)
[.131]
.049
(.069)
[.478]
Dummy Restart × (period – 15) −.310
(.275)
[.259]
.279
(.286)
[.330]
Dummy Control −8.929
(6.532)
[.172]
Dummy Control-VCM × (period) −.847*
(.098)
[.000]
Note: Clustered at group-level; estimated coefficient (standard errors in parenthesis); [p values in brackets].
*Significant at 5%.
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payoffs. That is, a person who receives better
access to the (publicly funded) good derives a
higher utility from it than a person who receives
restricted access. To model such situation, we
propose Rank-Order-VCM in which an indi-
vidual who contributes more to a public good
gains more from it than an individual who
contributes less. This is accomplished by rank-
ing the observed contributions and assigning a
higher personal marginal return from the public
good to a higher contributor. Rank-Order-VCM
thus adds a contest aspect into the picture but
keeps contributions voluntary. Furthermore, it
does not require the social planner to award a
fixed prize, which could change the equilibrium
predictions.
In the experiment we test the hypothesis
that rank-order competition, created by such
assignment of marginal returns, overcomes
the incentives to free-ride. This hypothesis
is motivated by the analysis of the best-
response correspondences.
The Control treatment features a dominant
strategy of contributing zero. In Rank-Order-
VCM the best response is not always unique
as there exist strategy profiles of the other
group members for which contributing zero
is not a best response. Although our imple-
mented Rank-Order-VCM maintains a unique
Nash equilibrium of zero contributions, it elic-
its higher contribution levels than our Control
treatment with random ranks and also sustains
a median contribution of 100% of the endow-
ment throughout the entire experiment, starting
from period 1 and including the last period. Our
results thus emphasize the power of rank-order
competition also in collective action scenarios
involving a tension between the self-interest
and the interest of the group. Where applica-
ble, this solution leads to contributions closer
to the social optimum even in nonequilibrium
instances as Rank-Order-VCM strengthens the
private incentive to contribute.15 This incentive
can be strengthened further by parameterizing
the mechanism in a way that all group members
contributing their entire endowment becomes
a Nash equilibrium. Naturally, the incentive
to contribute is stronger for individuals with
other-regarding preferences.
15. Consider the following example as an illustration. If
other group members in Control contribute 50, the payoff
from contributing 50 is 100 whereas the payoff from free-
riding is 125, that is, 25% higher. In contrast, in Rank-Order-
VCM the payoff from contributing 50 is 100 whereas the
payoff from free-riding is 102.5, that is, only 2.5% higher.
While previous studies have also shown that
contests can lead to decreased free-riding, in a
majority of them high-contributors get rewarded
with fixed prizes. In our view that approach has
two downsides: First, it is a costly solution, as
any prize must be subtracted from the collected
contributions. Second, as the size of the prize has
been found to influence behavior, it is not always
a priori guaranteed whether the contest will
have a positive net effect. This is of particular
concern for local public goods, which are limited
by geographical space, as well as congestible
goods such as a publicly funded swimming
pool.
Our laboratory version of Rank-Order-VCM
avoids these issues. At the same time, implement-
ing the mechanism in the field might introduce
new challenges, depending on the type of good
for which contributions are being raised. One
such undesirable outcome would be a perception
of rich having better access to the public good
which might be seen as unfair and thus have
consequences for the viability of the mechanism
within the same community. (For similar reasons
sports clubs often do not auction off season tick-
ets but allocate them in a lottery.) A related issue
might arise with limited capacity events, such
as stage productions, where higher contributors
receive greater access. If people paid a higher
price to obtain that access and were denied
because someone paid even more than them,
they might not participate in future fundraising.
It is therefore important to recognize our exper-
iment as a test-bed of Rank-Order-VCM with
promising results (see Servátka 2018). Regard-
ing the practical applicability of the mechanism,
there are multiple avenues for future research
related to the group size effects or aggregate
uncertainty that should be explored as the next
step. Ideally, these further tests would be con-
ducted in the field and will thus allow to identify
context-dependent behavioral limitations of
the mechanism and allow to fine-tune relevant
parameters to optimize its performance in a
given setting.
We note that Rank-Order-VCM can be made
applicable also to pure public goods by intro-
ducing a subsidy/tax scheme similar to Falkinger
et al. (2000) and where the subsidy/tax depends
on the rank of the person’s contribution within the
group (rather than how far it is from the average
as in the original setup by Falkinger et al.). The
subsidy/tax, which if implemented in practice
often comes with an administrative cost instead
of restricting access, is based on the sum of all
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TABLE 2
Random-Effects Regression: Contribution on
Ex-Post Best-Response in Rank-Order-VCM
(Column ID) (1) (2) (3)
Number of observations 928 928 928
Independent observations 8 8 8
Period −0.255 −0.021
(−1.01) (−0.14)
[0.311] [0.885]
Dummy Restart 4.519 0.871
(1.45) (0.46)
[0.148] [0.649]
Ex-post Best-Response 0.115* 0.116* 0.124*
(2.30) (2.26) (2.42)
[0.022] [0.024] [0.015]
Constant 33.00* 36.10* 34.35*
(4.75) (6.01) (5.03)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Clustered at individual and group level; estimated
coefficient (standard errors in parenthesis); [p values in
brackets].
*Significant at 5%.
contributions and is applied on the top of the
MPCR that is constant (say, 0.5) for all people in
the group. If G is the sum of all contributions, the
person with the highest rank then receives a sub-
sidy of 0.15G; the person with the second highest
contribution receives a subsidy of 0.05G;whereas
the persons with the third and the fourth highest
contributions are taxed 0.5G and 0.15G respec-
tively (i.e., receive a negative subsidy). In case of
a tie, the tax/subsidy is averaged as in the current
design. As with any changes in how the decision
problem is framed, splitting the personal multi-
plier into the uniform MPCR and a subsidy/tax
might affect the behavior and so further test-
ing of such framing is warranted. Nevertheless,
it demonstrates that the rank-order competition
idea could be appliedmore generally and not only
to impure public goods.
Finally, our obtained experimental results are
in line with the literature on social competition
which finds that providing information on the rel-
ative performance affects behavior of individuals
and entire markets, even when direct tournament
incentives are not present (e.g., Fatas, Morales,
and Jaramillo-Gutierrez 2015; Fischbacher and
Gächter 2010; Schoenberg and Haruvy 2012).
While in our setup the subjects do not receive a
direct payoff feedback of the other group mem-
bers, they do receive (anonymous) information
about the individual contributions, ordered from
highest to lowest, which allows them to cal-
culate their relative performance. In our view,
these additional nonmonetary incentives, which
Rank-Order-VCM crowds in, might explain why
it may convincingly outperform the standard
VCM. Like Nobel laureates or Olympic medal-
ists, who are not only richly awarded but also
acknowledged as outstanding individuals in their
discipline, the group members of Rank-Order-
VCM receive rank-acknowledgement and are
rank-dependently awarded. The discreetness of
these effects may, however, question the exis-
tence of pure strategy equilibria when incorpo-
rating other-regarding concerns in the form of
continuous trade-offs (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels
2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; and the review of
Cooper and Kagel 2016). While this is an inter-
esting phenomenon in its own right, in the cur-
rent paper we focus on the overall performance
of rank-order tournaments in a VCM setting and
leave the separation of monetary from nonmone-
tary incentives for future research.
APPENDIX A
A.1: RANK-ORDER-VCM TREATMENT
INSTRUCTIONS
The purpose of the experiment is to study how people
make decisions. From now until the end of the experiment,
unauthorized communication of any kind between partici-
pants is prohibited. If you want to ask any question, please
raise your hand first. Please turn off your cell-phone and do
not use the computer for any other purpose than your partic-
ipation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules,
we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from
all payments.
In the experiment you will earn money according to your
decisions and the decisions taken by the other participants. At
the end of the experiment you will be privately paid the sum
of your payoffs during the experiment.
With whom do you interact?
1. At the beginning of the experiment, all participants are
randomly assigned to groups of four. The composition of each
group remains the same throughout the experiment, but the
identity of the participants in the group will not be revealed to
you at any time.
2. The experiment consists of thirty rounds. After the first
fifteen rounds, there will be a restart of another fifteen rounds.
What do you have to do?
3. In every round you are endowed with 50 Cents. You
have to decide how to use this endowment; what amount you
allocate to a Project and howmuch you keep for yourself. The
other three participants in your group face the same decision
problem.
4. Themoney you allocate to the Project generates payoff
to you and to every other participant in your group. Themoney
you keep generates payoff only to you.
What will you earn?
5. In every round, your payoff will be computed
as follows.
Your round payoff = the money you keep for yourself
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+ the sum allocated to the Project by the four participants
in your group × your multiplier
6. Your multiplier is determined by the amount you allo-
cate to the Project and the amount allocated by the other
participants in your group. Given the allocation of the others
in your group, the higher your allocation to the Project, the
higher are your chances for a larger multiplier in that round.
In particular:
• If your allocation is the highest in the group, your
multiplier is 0.65.
• If your allocation is the second highest, your mul-
tiplier is 0.55.
• If your allocation is the third highest, your multi-
plier is 0.45.
• If your allocation is the lowest, your multiplier is
0.35.
7. In case of a tie, that is, if two or more participants
allocate the same amount to the Project, the corresponding
multipliers are averaged. For instance, if the second highest
allocation is equal to the third highest, the multiplier for the
two participants is 0.5 [= (0.55+ 0.45)/2]. Hence, participants
who allocate the same amount to the Project get the same
payoff.
How do you make your decisions?
8. In each round, you make your decision on the com-
puter by entering an amount into the input field on the screen
(you can select the input field with the mouse). Next you press
the OK button (with the mouse) to confirm your decision.
Note: After you have confirmed your decision you can not
revise it anymore.
What information will you receive?
9. After each round you receive feedback information on
the amount you and your group allocated to the Project. You
receive information on the individual allocation ordered from
highest to lowest, but you will not be able to trace the amount
to the person who allocated it. You also receive information
about your multiplier, the resulting payoff from the Project,
the Money kept, and your round payoff.
10. This information is recorded in a table on your screen
and will be available to you for all past rounds. At restart, the
information for the first 15 rounds is cleared.
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A.2: CONTROL TREATMENT INSTRUCTIONS
The purpose of the experiment is to study how people
make decisions. From now until the end of the experiment,
unauthorized communication of any kind between partici-
pants is prohibited. If you want to ask any question, please
raise your hand first. Please turn off your cell-phone and do
not use the computer for any other purpose than your partic-
ipation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules,
we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from
all payments.
In the experiment you will earn money according to your
decisions and the decisions taken by the other participants. At
the end of the experiment you will be privately paid the sum
of your payoffs during the experiment.
With whom do you interact?
1. At the beginning of the experiment, all participants are
randomly assigned to groups of four. The composition of each
group remains the same throughout the experiment, but the
identity of the participants in the group will not be revealed to
you at any time.
2. The experiment consists of thirty rounds. After the first
fifteen rounds, there will be a restart of another fifteen rounds.
What do you have to do?
3. In every round you are endowed with 50 Cents. You
have to decide how to use this endowment; what amount you
allocate to a Project and howmuch you keep for yourself. The
other three participants in your group face the same decision
problem.
4. Themoney you allocate to the Project generates payoff
to you and to every other participant in your group. Themoney
you keep generates payoff only to you.
What will you earn?
5. In every round, your payoff will be computed
as follows.
Your round payoff = the money you keep for yourself +
the sum allocated to the Project by the four participants
in your group × your multiplier
6. In each round your multiplier is randomly determined
by the computer; the computer draws a number 1, 2, 3, or 4
for each participant. The number is drawn with replacement;
therefore it is possible for the computer to draw the same num-
ber for more than one person in your group. Your multiplier
is determined according to the rank of your random number.
In particular:
• If your random number is the highest in the group,
your multiplier is 0.65.
• If your random number is the second highest, your
multiplier is 0.55.
• If your random number is the third highest, your
multiplier is 0.45.
• If your random number is the lowest, your multi-
plier is 0.35.
7. In case of a draw, that is, if two or more participants’
random number is the same, the corresponding multipliers
are averaged. For instance, if the second highest random
number is equal to the third highest, the multiplier for the
two participants is 0.5 [(= 0.55+ 0.45)/2]. You are informed
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about your multiplier only at the end of the period. Hence, you
make your decision about your allocation without knowing
the exact value of your multiplier.
How do you make your decisions?
8. In each round, you make your decision on the com-
puter by entering an amount into the input field on the screen
(you can select the input field with the mouse). Next you press
the OK button (with the mouse) to confirm your decision.
Note: After you have confirmed your decision you cannot
revise it anymore.
What information will you receive?
9. After each round you receive feedback information on
the amount you and your group allocated to the Project. You
receive information on the individual allocation ordered from
highest to lowest, but you will not be able to trace the amount
to the person who allocated it. You also receive information
about your multiplier, the resulting payoff from the Project,
the Money kept, and your round payoff.
10. This information is recorded in a table on your screen
and will be available to you for all past rounds. At restart, the
information for the first 15 rounds is cleared.
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TABLE B1
Random-Effects Dummy Regression: Contribution on Ex-Post Best-Response
Rank-Order-VCM
Only
Rank-Order-VCM
Only
Both
Treatments
Both
Treatments
Number of observations 928 928 1856 1856
Independent observations 8 8 16 16
Rank-Order-VCM treatment 19.104* 18.885*
(3.15) (3.08)
[0.002] [0.002]
Period −0.255 −0.551*
(−1.01) (−3.47)
[0.311] [0.001]
Dummy Restart 4.519 0.871 3.769* −4.169*
(1.45) (0.46) (2.329) (−2.40)
[0.148] [0.649] [0.022] [0.017]
Ex-post Best-Response 0.115* 0.124* 0.073 0.092
(2.30) (2.42) (1.30) (1.70)
[0.022] [0.015] [0.195] [0.090]
Constant 33.00* 34.35* 20.25* 23.48*
(4.75) (5.03) (4.83) (5.11)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Clustered at individual and group level; estimated coefficient (standard errors in parenthesis); [p values in brackets].
*Significant at 5%.
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